The Iranian regime is reportedly in negotiations with two Chinese companies specializing in small satellite production with high-resolution cameras. This move aims to enhance the regime’s surveillance and intelligence-gathering capabilities, potentially providing detailed images of military targets across Israel and the Middle East.
According to the Washington Post, American, European, and Middle Eastern officials express concern that this collaboration could significantly bolster the Iranian regime’s ability to monitor military installations belonging to the United States, Israel, and Arab rivals in the Persian Gulf.
The satellites under discussion boast equipment at least twice as sensitive as Iran’s current satellite technology. This potential deal emerges in the context of strengthening ties between Tehran and Beijing, which were formalized three years ago with a 25-year agreement. Previously, the Iranian regime had received assistance from Russia in developing its surveillance satellite network.
Confidential reports suggest that a deal with China could provide the regime with new capabilities in ballistic missile targeting and attack warning systems. There are concerns that these technologies might be shared with Iran’s allied groups.
While no official agreement has been announced, relations between the Iranian regime and Changguang Satellite Technology Co. Ltd. are progressing. There have been several delegation exchanges and extended visits by Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) personnel to China. Changguang produces satellites capable of 30-centimeter resolution imagery, comparable to advanced American and European commercial satellites.
The regime is also exploring cooperation with another Chinese company, Minospace, which manufactures the “Taijing” series satellites. Neither of these Chinese companies is currently subject to U.S. or international economic sanctions.
Military relations between Iran and China had waned in the mid-2000s due to sanctions pressure related to Iran’s nuclear program. However, these ties have improved in recent years, including agreements on navigation equipment and missile systems.
China is now the largest buyer of Iranian oil products, with bilateral trade reaching $32 billion last year. However, this figure is still lower than China’s trade with Iran’s major Persian Gulf rivals, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.
Despite improving relations, Chinese officials remain cautious to avoid escalating tensions with Iran’s neighbors or risking international sanctions against Chinese companies. China also seeks to avoid any conflict that could disrupt vital oil routes in the Persian Gulf.
To date, China has not publicly condemned any of the regime and its proxy forces’ actions in the Middle East, who are the main warmonger in the region.
Analysts suggest that China may justify its cooperation with Iran’s space program under a civilian pretext, as surveillance satellites have numerous non-military applications such as environmental monitoring and disaster management.
Gary Samore, a former senior advisor on arms control during the Clinton and Obama administrations, notes that from China’s perspective, cooperating with the Iranian regime on surveillance technology doesn’t constitute providing weapons, so such collaboration is likely. He adds that China tries to steer clear of political issues to avoid jeopardizing its relations with Saudi Arabia and the UAE.
Meanwhile, Russia remains the primary supporter of Iran’s space program. Since 2022, Russia has launched at least two Iranian surveillance satellites, including Pars-1, which was sent into orbit in February using a Russian Soyuz-2 rocket.
The Iranian regime claims to have successfully launched four satellites in January, including three telecommunications satellites and one IRGC surveillance satellite.
This potential collaboration with Chinese satellite manufacturers represents a significant step in the Iranian regime’s efforts to enhance its surveillance capabilities, raising concerns among regional and global powers about the implications for security in the Middle East.