The United States remains critically unprepared to defend its agriculture sector against biological attacks, despite growing threats from foreign adversaries and terrorist organizations, according to testimony delivered to Congress.
Dr. Asha M. George, Executive Director of the Bipartisan Commission on Biodefense, warned the House Committee Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Emergency Management and Technology that agricultural terrorism poses an existential threat to American economic and national security; one that current federal programs are ill-equipped to address.
“If the funding disappears, I think we’re at risk of being attacked. Period,” Dr. George told lawmakers during the September 16 hearing titled “Surveying the Threat of Agroterrorism: Perspectives on Food, Agriculture, and Veterinary Defense.”
Historical Threats Meet Modern Vulnerabilities
Dr. George, a former intelligence officer, emphasized that agricultural warfare is not a new concept. During World Wars I and II, foreign nations specifically developed biological agents targeting U.S. agriculture. Today, active offensive biological programs exist in Russia, North Korea, Iran, and China, with terrorist organizations also expressing interest in agricultural attacks.
“Terrorist organizations around the world have also expressed interest, partly because of the economic security impact,” Dr. George testified. She cited wheat blast as an example: a disease that, if introduced to U.S. crops, would leave grocery store shelves empty of bread and flour, creating widespread panic beyond just agricultural losses.
The economic stakes are staggering. According to the U.S. Department of Agriculture, agriculture, food, and related industries contributed approximately $1.537 trillion to gross domestic product (GDP) in 2023. A single pathogen could devastate multiple industries. African Swine Fever alone could cause $15 billion in losses to the domestic pork industry within two years of introduction, with long-term losses potentially reaching $50 billion.
Funding Disparities Leave Agriculture Exposed
Despite these threats, federal investment in agricultural biodefense significantly lags behind human health spending. The first-ever federal biodefense spending analysis revealed that in Fiscal Year 2022, the Department of Agriculture spent $700 million on biodefense activities compared to $8.4 billion spent by the Department of Health and Human Services.
The National Veterinary Stockpile received just $6.5 million in FY2025 appropriations compared to $980 million for the Strategic National Stockpile protecting human health. The National Animal Health Laboratory Network and National Plant Diagnostic Network remain chronically underfunded relative to their missions.
“Biodefense has always been disgracefully, woefully, and incomprehensively underfunded,” Dr. George statedin her written testimony. “We cannot continue to rely forever on emergency supplemental appropriations or withdrawals from the Commodity Credit Corporation to make up for weak defense against biological threats.”
Recent Avian Flu Outbreak Exposes Gaps
The uneven federal response to last year’s highly pathogenic avian influenza outbreak demonstrated critical preparedness gaps. States lack coordinated approaches to disease threats, the federal government lacks sufficient speed in addressing fast-moving novel pathogens, and medical countermeasure development and stockpiling remain inadequate.
“Not all states are taking the same approach to responding to disease threats to food and agriculture,” Dr. George warned. “Agricultural producers need to be engaged as equal partners and educated about the risks posed by newly emerging and newly transmissible diseases.”
Foreign Research Activities Raise Red Flags
During the hearing’s questioning, Dr. George referenced concerning incidents of foreign nationals conducting unauthorized biological research on U.S. soil. One recent incident was the June 2025 case of two Chinese nationals arrested and charged in Michigan with smuggling a dangerous biological pathogen into the U.S. The scientists smuggled in a fungus called Fusarium graminearum, which scientific literature classifies as a potential agroterrorism weapon, as it can cause “a disease of wheat, barley, maize, and rice, and is responsible for billions of dollars in economic losses worldwide each year,” according to the Department of Justice statement.
“There’s probably more of it going on than any of us realize,” Dr. George testified. She also noted the U.S. lacks effective nationwide investigatory mechanisms and attribution capabilities to determine the scope of such activities.
Homeland Security Programs Fall Short
Dr. George was sharply critical of Department of Homeland Security (DHS) biodefense programs, particularly the BioWatch biological detection system that has operated with the same technology since its 2003 deployment. The system costs taxpayers more than $80 million annually but barely functions, she testified.
After seven years, DHS terminated its troubled BD21 replacement program in 2024, leaving the nation no closer to an advanced environmental detection system. “Hospital admissions would indicate a biological event long before the system definitively reported a positive test result,” Dr. George noted.
The National Biosurveillance Integration Center, intended to provide early warning of biological events, lacks the authorities and resources to function effectively. The Department of Agriculture does not share state and industry data with DHS, forcing the center to rely solely on publicly available information.
President Trump’s FY2026 budget proposes eliminating the Office of Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction entirely and dispersing its programs to other DHS components.
Border Vulnerabilities and Testing Gaps
When asked about vulnerable points of entry, Dr. George identified a critical gap: items intercepted by Customs and Border Protection agents, including seeds, plants, and animal products, are destroyed without testing.
“I would like to see those items tested. One to see if they are in fact carrying a high consequence agent, but secondly, what is the agent?” she testified. “It gives us a better sense of the actual risk that we’re facing. We know we can’t intercept everything, but if we can test the things that we do intercept, then we should have a better idea of what’s coming in, where it’s coming from, is it an agent that is of high consequence or not.”
State Resources and Path Forward
Dr. George also warned that foreign acquisition of U.S. farmland could enable reconnaissance near research facilities and vulnerable agricultural sites.
State, local, tribal, and territorial governments bear primary responsibility for food and agriculture defense but lack adequate time and funding. “Even putting into the budget statements saying that the funding needs to be cut is a clear indication to others outside of our country that now we’ve created a vulnerability,” Dr. George warned.
The Bipartisan Commission on Biodefense, co-chaired by former Homeland Security Secretary Tom Ridge and former HHS Secretary Donna Shalala, has issued multiple reports since 2015. The Commission’s 2024 National Blueprint contains 36 recommendations for better federal coordination, increased state and local funding, improved animal medical countermeasures, and enhanced biosurveillance through land-grant university partnerships.
Dr. George urged Congress to require regular DHS biodefense reviews and annual reporting aligned with the National Biodefense Strategy. “The Nation still requires biosurveillance, diagnostics, vaccines, therapeutics, and well-equipped public health and animal health departments,” she concluded.
The hearing underscored a stark reality: As adversaries expand biological weapons capabilities and terrorist organizations eye agriculture as a strategic target, America’s farmlands and food systems remain dangerously exposed.