Russia’s aggression against Ukraine and other neighbors is transforming the Black Sea into Eurasia’s strategic frontier. Russia has disrupted flows of energy, food, and other commodities; generated millions of migrants; and heightened insecurity not just in Ukraine but also across the entire Black Sea region. These efforts constitute part of a much longer and larger strategy. Russia does not merely seek to dominate Ukraine. It wants to render each of the other five states that border the Black Sea—as well as Moldova, which borders Romania and Ukraine and whose waters flow into the sea—subservient to its interests so that it can exercise veto power over choices these countries make. Moscow also aspires to use the Black Sea as a platform from which to project power and influence throughout the Middle East, the Mediterranean, and the Caucasus.
Russia’s quest to become the dominant force in the Black Sea is an essential element in its strategy to reassert itself as a great power. The Kremlin believes that a failure to establish a commanding presence in the region would leave Russia exposed to Western encroachment, render it less able to influence adjoining areas and disrupt commodity exports that are critical to the Russian economy. Turkey poses the greatest obstacle to Russian objectives in the region because it is the only Black Sea state that Russia has not historically dominated and it is a NATO member. But even after the end of the Cold War, the Kremlin retained considerable levers of influence over the former Soviet empire’s Black Sea space in Bulgaria, Georgia, Moldova, Romania, and Ukraine.
In recent decades, Russia has sought to further subordinate these states to Moscow through a combination of persuasion and coercion. Increasing Russia’s Black Sea presence is also at the heart of President Vladimir Putin’s decades-long plan to resurrect the country’s maritime power. He prioritized modernizing the Black Sea Fleet, whose interventions proved critical in supporting Russia’s Mediterranean Squadron and its 2015 intervention in Syria. Putin has ignored internationally recognized borders to seize a great expanse of Black Sea coastline, including Georgia’s territory of Abkhazia in 2008, Ukraine’s Crimea region in 2014, and the Ukrainian part of the Sea of Azov coast in 2022. Although Ukraine has prevented Russia from taking all of its Black Sea coast, Moscow has deployed naval mines as well as blockaded and bombed Ukrainian ports to sever Ukraine’s sea access and minimize the presence of other navies.
While the world has focused on Russia’s battle for Ukraine, Moscow has often advanced these goals under the radar—extending the war, skirting sanctions, disrupting markets, and enhancing its influence in the Middle East and North Africa. Other key leaders should work with Black Sea countries to build a region more resilient to Russian pressure. Failing to do so will likely prolong the war, further enable Russia’s massive human rights violations, exacerbate refugee flows, and provoke turbulence in global energy and commodity markets. Regional insecurities are, in turn, likely to spill over into the Caucasus, the Middle East, and the Mediterranean.
Black Swan
For centuries, the Black Sea has served as a critical junction for the movement of people and commodities. Russia has long believed that controlling the sea is essential for its security: in 1783, Catherine the Great annexed Crimea from the Ottoman Empire to increase the Russian Empire’s control over the Black Sea. Throughout much of the nineteenth century, Russia competed with the Ottoman Empire and Europe’s major powers for influence in and around the sea. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union became the region’s leading power. Turkey was its main competitor, but Moscow came to dominate all the other Black Sea coastal states.
After the Soviet Union collapsed, in 1991, Russia’s regional role changed dramatically. Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine became independent countries and pursued closer ties to the West. Bulgaria and Romania joined NATO in 2004 and the European Union in 2007. As a result, Russia lost its access to parts of the Black Sea coastline. In March 2014, Putin justified the annexation of Crimea by warning that otherwise, “NATO ships would have ended up in the city of Russian navy glory, Sevastopol.” Between 2014 and 2022, the Kremlin tripled the amount of Black Sea coastline under its de facto control and strengthened its influence by wielding a combination of military, diplomatic, economic, energy, and disinformation tactics.
Today, the Black Sea is a central hub for Russia’s energy trade: Russian oil and oil products account for most of the cargo flowing out of Novorossiysk, the largest port in Russia and the Black Sea basin and the fifth-largest in Europe. The country’s remaining westward pipeline gas routes run under the Black Sea to Turkey and then on to southeastern Europe. The sea is also vital to Russian agriculture: Russia routes almost all of its grain exports and a significant proportion of its fertilizer and other agricultural goods through its ports there. These flows enable Moscow to increase revenue, create new markets, establish trading systems less reliant on the U.S. dollar, and gain influence in recipient countries.
Russia now employs a variety of interference tactics to swing Black Sea states toward Moscow. Hard power, of course, remains a crucial element of its strategy, and not only in Ukraine. The 1991–93 civil war in Georgia unsettled that country’s political life and granted Moscow opportunities for influence; in 2008, Russia invaded and defeated Georgia in a brief war and recognized the separatist enclaves of South Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent states. About eight percent of Georgians have been internally displaced because of that invasion and other Russian efforts to exploit the country’s ethnic conflicts.
But military campaigns are not the only way Russia has sought to bring the Black Sea region to heel. The Kremlin has frequently used disinformation to persuade populations in post-communist countries to align with Russia over what the Kremlin calls pro-Western elites, appealing to people disillusioned with their governments’ failures. Moscow has also supported pro-Russian political parties, interfered in elections, and sought to carry out coups against incumbents.
And historically, Russia has leveraged Bulgaria, Moldova, and Ukraine’s dependence on Russian energy to influence each country’s elites. Moscow cut all gas transit through Ukraine to Europe several times before its initial 2014 incursion and shut off gas supplies to Bulgaria in 2022 and Moldova in early 2025. It has restricted food flows, banning wheat exports to Georgia or limiting Moldovan wine exports to Russia, for instance, to discipline Georgia and Moldova when it believes that either is diverging from Moscow’s priorities. And Russian interference extends to the cultural: the Russian Orthodox Church appeals to its counterparts abroad to battle “satanic” or “woke” Western culture. The Kremlin also deploys espionage and sabotage to destabilize these societies.
Mixed Record
Moscow’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine both accelerated its efforts to dominate the Black Sea and revealed the benefits of the groundwork it laid earlier to solidify control. Its ability to disrupt maritime traffic has scrambled regional energy flows: although Russia’s gas exports to Bulgaria, Romania, and Ukraine have declined significantly since February 2022, its exports to Georgia and Turkey have increased substantially as each of those countries has refused to join sanctions on Russia. Turkey has become the world’s largest buyer of Russian refined oil products. Many of these imports are relabeled in Georgia and Turkey and then reexported to circumvent the European Union’s import ban.
The sea has also become a major staging area for Russia’s “shadow fleet” of unregistered ships, which it uses to circumvent Western sanctions. Russia has used its access to the Black Sea to disrupt its agricultural competitors. Former Russian President Dmitry Medvedev calls food Russia’s “silent weapon.” The Kremlin has stolen Ukrainian agricultural products and bombed Ukraine’s farmlands, agricultural infrastructure, and ports to undercut a primary source of Kyiv’s revenue and gain new markets for Moscow.
Russia’s efforts to destabilize other Black Sea states are a tale of uneven successes and setbacks. The region’s weakest links are Georgia and Moldova. Russian forces are stationed in each country’s breakaway regions, and broader domestic discontent provides fertile ground for subversive Russian tactics. Georgia’s ruling party, Georgian Dream, has turned toward Russia, suspending accession negotiations with the EU in November 2024 and later introducing legislation that represses freedom of speech and assembly. Although a large segment of Georgian society opposes these moves, the party has managed to win successive elections; many Georgians fear that if the country continues along a pro-EU path, Russia will invade again. Intimidation apparently works. The victory of pro-Western candidates in recent Moldovan and Romanian elections illustrates the limits of Russian interference, but the Kremlin is working hard to manipulate Moldova’s fall 2025 parliamentary elections to boost pro-Russian parties.
The fight for Ukraine is also a fight for the future of the Black Sea.
Moscow has secured access to key grain markets at Ukraine’s expense, but flexing its agricultural power has aggravated tensions with recipient countries. African leaders have told Putin that the war has created food insecurity: in July 2023, for instance, the Kenyan diplomat Korir Sing’Oei called Russia’s withdrawal from a pact that allowed Ukraine to export grain through the Black Sea “a stab on the back.” Although Moscow has managed to leverage the sea to evade sanctions, generate revenue, and access critical technology, that effort has required developing elaborate and inefficient trading and shipping schemes, and some Black Sea countries have also sought alternative energy sources. The war in Ukraine has also forced Moscow to contend with the largest outflow of its own people since the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution.
Ukraine’s success in denying sea control to Russia and inflicting heavy damage on its Black Sea Fleet has crimped Moscow’s influence over nearby regions. So did Turkey’s decision to close the Turkish straits to Russian military vessels days after Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Ankara has complex ties with Moscow: Turkey is a significant trading partner and purchaser of Russian oil, as well as a key transit route for Russian gas. Yet Ankara’s choice to close the Turkish straits not only limited Moscow’s ability to wage naval war against Ukraine; it also stopped Russia from using the sea to project naval power in the Mediterranean and the Middle East.
Moscow remains a significant player in the South Caucasus but has lost its role as the regional hegemon; Turkey now plays a much more important regional role than it did before 2022. Until 2023, Russia acted as Armenia’s protector in its conflict with Azerbaijan over the enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh, but when Azerbaijan attacked Armenia in 2023, Russia, its military overextended, did not come to Armenia’s assistance. After decades of fighting, in August 2025, Armenia and Azerbaijan signed a peace agreement to end the conflict—but they signed it at the White House, not the Kremlin, highlighting the limits of Russian influence in the region. Strains to its military capabilities also forced Moscow to prioritize its war in Ukraine over its support for the Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad. After the ouster of Assad’s regime last December, the Kremlin is scrambling to regain influence with Damascus’s new leadership. It needs such influence: the loss of Russia’s Khmeimim Air Base and Tartus Naval Base in Syria would complicate Moscow’s efforts to expand its operations in the Mediterranean and Africa. And Russia now faces rising competition in the Black Sea and Central Asia from China and the European Union, each of which is building out its economic and political presence.
Sea Change
Policymakers seeking to exploit Moscow’s mixed record in the Black Sea must overcome several challenges. The region’s post-communist countries continue to struggle, leaving them vulnerable to Russian influence. The end of U.S. foreign assistance programs in Ukraine and other states in the region geared toward fighting corruption, supporting an independent news media, and promoting economic development, health, and good governance has left a gap that only EU and NATO allies can fill. EU accession negotiations with Moldova and Ukraine are moving slowly and face opposition from some member states.
The EU and NATO have each put forth new strategies for the region, but both face obstacles to implementation. Brussels’s plan is full of good intentions but lacks concrete commitments and has no budget. NATO has focused on defending its northeastern flank, even though Russia’s last three invasions have taken place in the Black Sea, not the Baltic. In the past three years, EU and NATO countries have prioritized their own resilience strategies; now they must develop plans to stabilize vulnerable Black Sea partners.
Brussels must mobilize funding to match the ambitious rhetoric it presented in May 2025 on a so-called connectivity agenda with Black Sea states and the Caucasus, Eurasia, and the Middle East. The EU should forge West-East corridors that link the Mediterranean, Black, and Caspian Seas––circumventing Russia and including Turkey, which EU plans have thus far avoided. Additionally, members of the Three Seas Initiative, which seeks to build digital, energy, and transport links between the Adriatic, Black, and Baltic Seas, should invite Ukraine and Moldova to become full members
Black Sea states should further develop their own considerable energy resources. Bulgaria, Georgia, and Romania are already constructing an underwater Black Sea energy cable that would bypass Russia and directly connect Azerbaijan’s renewable energy resources to Europe’s energy grid. Romania’s recent offshore gas discoveries, once fully exploited, could lead Bucharest to become the EU’s largest gas producer. Turkey’s Sakarya gas field holds similar promise. The war has limited Ukraine’s ability to exploit its gas resources, but in peacetime, EU and U.S. energy companies and international financial assistance could help the country become a major gas producer.
Building Blocks
Turkey will be central to any strategy to prevent Russia from controlling the Black Sea. Ankara often diverges from its NATO allies on the nature of regional challenges: it has armed Ukraine and refused to recognize Russia’s annexation of Crimea, for instance, but maintains lucrative commercial ties with Moscow. European and U.S. policymakers should recognize this complexity and build on shared interests such as strengthening regional supply chains and infrastructure links as well as upholding freedom of navigation and curbing Russian expansionism in the Black Sea.
Turkey opposes a formal NATO maritime presence in the sea involving countries outside its immediate coastal region. But Ankara is offering concrete material support for Bulgaria’s and Romania’s defense modernization efforts. By 2030, NATO plans to make its installation near Constanta, Romania, its principal Black Sea site and its largest base in Europe. The alliance could bolster its forward presence by improving air defense capabilities and deploying additional forces to its multinational battle groups in Bulgaria and Romania. NATO could rotate ships and allied maritime groups in the Black Sea complemented by regular air patrols and exercises. Enhanced intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance could better monitor Russian activities.
The United States has an interest in a Europe that is whole, free, and at peace—and thus in enhancing freedom in the Black Sea region. Strengthening U.S. support for NATO and EU initiatives can have an outsize impact at relatively low cost. Following the Trump-Putin Alaska summit, however, it is unclear whether Trump will exert pressure on Russia to end the conflict, which may continue for some time. Yet halting Moscow’s expansionist aims must start with ending that war. Russia’s targeting of civilian infrastructure has already pushed millions from their homes and entrenched Russian domination in occupied Ukrainian lands.
The Kremlin is likely to persist in these efforts until international actors understand that the fight for Ukraine is also a fight for the future of the Black Sea. Efforts to end the war must be paired with a robust strategy to prevent Moscow’s dominance in the greater Black Sea region. North American and European policymakers should prioritize initiatives designed to improve the region’s democratic governance and economic development and assure the secure production and transit of commodities. If such steps fail to stabilize the region, Russia’s aggression in Ukraine may well extend to Moldova and Georgia and could even balloon into a direct confrontation with NATO states that border the Black Sea—the consequences of which would ripple across markets worldwide and threaten an even wider variety of U.S. and European interests.
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